In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
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President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
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The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 20. This is the last part.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Qualities of character - such as professional ethics and leadership - play a significant role in ensuring that politically controversial assessments are subjected to the highest standards of analytic tradecraft.(redacted) In offering recommendations, it should be noted that there are limits to what can be achieved by procedural or legislative dictates alone.
Recommendation #1: Improve Peer Review of Controversial Assessments Involving Limited-Access Intelligence
To strike a better balance between the need to protect sensitive sources and the requirement to produce a properly reviewed analytic product, IC agencies might consider establishing a senior analytic peer review team.(redacted)
A small team of long-serving senior analysts from outside the project lead component or retired analysts on contract, could be read-on to compartmented reporting in order to double check that sources are accurately quoted, see that judgments are corroborated, challenge assumptions, consider alternative analytic hypotheses, and to ensure experienced review outside of line management.
Should significant analytic differences arise, the peer review team's concerns would be highlighted in the final product, both to inform the reader and to demonstrate that alternative views were considered and addressed.
CIA officers said the Ombudsman for Analytic integrity did not review the ICA, because no tradecraft complaint about the product was filed by the few cleared authors. For controversial assessments involving limited-access intelligence, the Ombudsman might also be enlisted as a matter of policy.
ClA officers said only five CIA analysts wrote the ICA - with one doing the bulk of the drafting - and the DCIA subjected their draft to what some CIA officers described as an "unusually limited and hurried" review and coordination process.(redacted)
Given the significance of the ICA for America, DCIA's decision to limit peer review of the ICA - written by just five analysts - cannot be excused by the sensitivity of some reporting used. The CIA should have been subjected to a broader, more deliberate, and more independent review and coordination process.(redacted)
Over 250 people saw the most sensitive final version of the ICA, so it seems reasonable that a second analytic team could have been cleared to see ICA raw source reports, review tradecraft, and consider the ICA's lack of alternative explanations.(redacted)
Recommendation #2: Require Political Appointees to Recuse Themselves From Management of Controversial Assessments During the Presidential Transition
To reduce the prospect for politicization negatively affecting controversial assessments, the Committee recommends that outgoing political appointees should recuse themselves from managing controversial assessments during the transition period between administrations. Political appointees should consider removing themselves from all aspects of management, production timelines, ordering dissemination of substandard reports, product review, and briefings of analytic findings.
Rushing a significant assessment to completion an the orders of a political appointee nearing the end of his or her service could undermine confidence in the objectivity of the assessment.
This is particularly important for products based on highly compartmented reporting, which are not subjected to normal coordination processes, and are seen by fewer analysts and managers.
Recommendation #3: Mandate Special Context Statement for Publishing and Citing Substandard Raw Intelligence Reports
To discourage misleading citations of substandard raw intelligence reports, IC collectors might consider developing more stringent context statement policies for cases where a policymaker, intelligence agency director, or senior analytic manager wants to publish raw intelligence information that fails to meet normal publication standards. Citation of such a report in any finished analytic product should require a same-page footnote quoting the abbreviated context statement.
The objective of the special context statement would be to:
Ensure that readers - particularly busy policymakers who may lack the time to read the original raw reporting - are made aware of factors affecting confidence in the raw intelligence.
Stringent context statements should flag all factors affecting the reliability of the information, such as clarity, plausibility, and source access, knowledge, or bias.
APPENDIX A: ICA TIMELINE
6 November - Election Eve IC Assessments Do Not Mention Putin Helping or Even Showing Concern About Trump's Election Chances
Two days before American voters cast their ballots for President, a 15-person multi-agency task force known as the "Directors' Fusion Cell," transmitted its final memorandum on Russia's influence campaign to a select audience. The CIA Director shared this memorandum exclusively with the White House, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and directors of NSA and FBI. The memo's authors enjoyed unique and privileged access to the most sensitive compartmented intelligence, including reports withheld from the vast majority of intelligence Community (IC) analysts.(redacted)
The election eve Fusion Cell memo made no mention of Putin "aspiring" for a Trump victory, even as the US polls showed the race to be close. The memo predicted Moscow would:(redacted)
1. (redacted) Continue influence operations to undermine the legitimacy of the US electoral process and degrade Secretary Clinton - whom Putin expected to win - and her presumptive Administration.(redacted)
2. (redacted) Seek to publish material that would "embarrass the incoming Administration" and "cast doubt on their integrity."(redacted)
3. (redacted) The memo concluded that, "Such efforts would also support Putin's domestic claims that the US is a corrupt, hypocritical, and undemocratic pretender to global leadership."(redacted)
(redacted) The memo's only mention of candidate Trump was to note that "Putin did not care who wins the election," according to a close associate of the Russian President, and that Putin said he was "prepared to outmaneuver whichever candidate wins."(redacted)
8 November - Trump Wins
The subsequent election of Donald Trump was as big a surprise in Moscow as it was in Washington DC, based on Embassy and media reporting.(redacted) Back in the US, media pundits struggled to explain how the American voters had chosen an upstart political outsider over a veteran establishment politician.
5 December - The House Intelligence Committee Receives the First Post-election Classified Briefing on Putin's Campaign
The FBI's Director of Counterintelligence and the DNI's National Intelligence Officer for Russia led a classified briefing that described Putin's leak operations, but made no mention of Putin "aspiring" to elect Trump.(redacted)
6 December - Obama Orders a Rewrite of IC Assessments on Russian Activities During the
Election
The President directed the IC to review their work to date on the Russian influence campaign, and quickly produce the new ICA for release in early January, before President-elect Trump took office. The ICA would rehash much of the previously published material on Russian activities, but would also include the judgment that President Putin "aspired" for Trump to win. CIA would be the lead drafter, in coordination with FBI and NSA.(redacted)
- Five CIA analysts wrote the ICA, presenting a draft to DCIA by 22 December. The authors would later express their surprise that management made few changes to their draft during the review process.(redacted)
8 December - DCIA Brennan Orders Publication of Substandard Reporting on Russian Activities During the Election
Acting on President Obama's orders, DCIA Brennan directed a "full review" and publication of raw HUMINT information that had been collected before the election. CIA officers said that some of this information had been held on the orders of DCIA, while other reporting had been judged by experienced CIA officers to have not met longstanding publication standards. Some of the latter was unclear or from unknown subsources, but would nonetheless be published after the election - over the objections of veteran officers - on orders of DCIA and cited in the ICA to support claims that Putin aspired to help Trump win.(redacted)
5-6 January - The ICA Is Officially Launched
On 5 January, the most sensitive classified version of the ICA was briefed to President Obama and shared with about 250 Administration officials and policy makers.
On 6 January, the ICA was briefed to President-elect Trump, and the unclassified version was posted on the DNI website.(redacted)
The unclassified ICA key judgments were identical to the classified versions: "Putin and the Russian government developed a clear preference for Trump" and "aspired to help [Trump's] election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton."(redacted)